The Case for No-Space

C.A. Postlethwaite

Abstract

If empty space is absence, then there may exist only matter, energy and absence in the physical world. Under this materialist view, space is not equivalent to low-level energy fields nor to infinitely small presences of particles. Under this view, space is complete and utter absence. If so, entangled quantum particles have nothing, I repeat: nothing, between them. Which means we detect distances which are not actually there. I attempt to lay out an argument for the view that space at bottom is inexistent. I also gauge the feasibility of this argument’s strategic premises. 

Introduction

In everyday experience, it seems that real distances exist between physical objects[1]. But it may be that the totality of the universe constitutes an unbroken continuum of physical particles and energy fields with no real break. A lack, or actual absence, is what I suggest we intuitively call ‘space’.

The view that space is absence can be made to persist however much we hone-in or out. At closer inspection, emptiness can still seem to stand between electrons, protons and neutrons. And this view could also hold when considering the tiniest of elementary particles such as quarks, leptons, bosons, hadrons, strings or whatever else physicists say might exist at the subatomic level. It seems that the tiniest of things must either: 1) buzz-around wherever absence allows, 2) displace other objects as they buzz about, or 3) not buzz about at all.[2] Bigger objects such as asteroids, planets, stars and galaxies could follow the same criteria (except that in their case, ‘moving’ seems more adequate than ‘buzzing’). So there seems to be no obvious controversy in thinking that space could be empty, though other objects may interrupt the emptiness between the objects of our concern: whether we consider molecules interrupting the absence between office furniture; or else asteroids between planets, or even subatomic particles between atoms, etc. It seems that we can regard the concept of space as being always the absence which lies between objects. Somewhat commonsensically then, emptiness, or absence of material objects, is what separates the physical objects of our concern.

The concept of space, on these terms, depends entirely on the existence of material objects. This, Lowe classifies as a “-very extreme- form of relationalism [according to which] space as such does not exist at all, only spatial relations between material objects”[3]. As far as we have up to now been concerned, only objects really exist. I have been talking, and will continue to do so, as though it is uncontroversial that material objects do have properties, and do effectively stand in certain relations to each other. The question of whether the relations between material objects and the properties of material objects can be predicated about by employing the concept of space will be considered further ahead. For now, let us consider what I have said above in order that we see how, at least intuitively, an opposing view of space can be rejected. I.e., we can see how the view that space is an absence is betrayed when we bestow presence upon a state of affairs in which absence may obtain, e.g. when we say that the seven inches that stand between the waste-bin and the desk are a presence.

Up to now, we have either ignored, or found no reason to stipulate space as being a substance, as the ‘absolutist’ or ‘substantivalist’ conception of space suggests.[4] For the substantivalist, “space exists as an immaterial entity in its own right, independent of any material objects which may occupy it”. (Lowe,2002: 264) The substantivalist view may be justified in many ways. Isaac Newton’s observations resulted in one of the best known arguments in favor of substantivalism. He claimed that the absolute acceleration of objects cannot be adequately explained by relying only on the motion between objects. (Newman, 209) Newton suggested that space is something real and fixed, in respect to which objects move, and which objects can be seen to occupy. Of course another quite commonsensical justification for considering space as a real object is the fact that we can talk about space’s nature, its features and properties. As Lowe points out, part of the problem with regarding space as an absence is that it’s hard to see how objects, or anything for that matter, could occupy an absence; additionally, it seems space has a nature as well as features. These considerations present difficulties for a relationalist about space.  (Lowe, 2002: 256)

 These as well as other concerns will be mentioned ahead. For now, let it suffice to say that it is the former intuition, that space is fundamentally the relation between physical objects, whose metaphysical plausibility I wish to defend.

The bare argument

Since I will focus on some of the individual premises, I present the argument in extracted form.

1. If space is real then it is necessarily not the case that space is merely a representation.
2. If it is possibly false that our representations of space have a referent then it is possible that space is merely a representation.
3. If we are confronted with absence between material objects and if it is possible that if we are confronted with absence between material objects then the content of our representation of absence between material objects is “space”, then it is possible that our representation is inaccurate because there is no space there.
4. If it is possible that our representation is inaccurate because there is no space there, then it is possible that our representation of space fails to refer.
5. If it is possible that our representation of space fails to refer, then it is possibly false that our representations of space have a referent.
6. We are confronted with absence between material objects and it is possible that if we are confronted with absence between material objects, then the content of our representations of absence between material objects is “space”.
7. Thus it is possible that our representation is inaccurate because there is no space there.
8. Thus it is possible that our representation of space fails to refer.
9. Thus it is possibly false that our representation of space have a referent.
10. Thus it is possible that space is merely a representation.
11. Thus it is possible that space is not real.
12. If space is real then it is not the case that it is possible that space is not real.
13. Thus space is not real.
    
    

Explaining and evaluating

As far as I can tell, the argument is valid. Replacing the propositions in the order that they appear in the argument, starting with the letter ‘A’ and continuing in alphabetical order, we get something like:

1. A > □⌐B
2. ◊⌐C > ◊B
3. [D & ◊(D > E)] > ◊F
4. ◊F > ◊G
5. ◊G > ◊⌐C
6. D & ◊(D > E)
7. ◊F
8. ◊G
9. ◊⌐C
10. ◊B
11. ◊⌐A
12. A > ⌐◊⌐A
13. ⌐A

“Space” in the argument is a rigid designator. It is a term utilized that putatively “refer[s] to a certain object and contribute[s] nothing else to the propositions expressed with [the term’s] aid”. (Lowe, 2002: 89) That is, “space” is attempting to point out something that putatively exists in the world.

The argument assumes the possibility of absences. This can get quite muddled. It is not clear to me whether the logic that I am relying upon copes with absence in the way that our conception (at least our putative conception of absence) requires. An absence in the way it is conceived here is not “something which is ‘nothing’”. However contrived the sentence in quotations may seem, it appears to me that there is a way for us to distinguish between “something which is ‘nothing’” and “nothing at all”.

With the scarce notions that I have about these matters of logic, it seems to me that the difference is placed in relief with Quine’s method for determining ontological commitments. I am unsure whether the absence I am referring can be quantified over. I think that the previous sentence should not be considered to be adequately symbolized in the language of first-order predicate logic. (Ney, 2014: 41) The argument requires that it is at least possible to reject any ontological commitment about space. That is, we cannot even accurately say that “absence” is something which predication might be doubted, since we would be leaving open the impossibility of its predication, which would be a contradiction in case that predication about it were impossible.

Absence for the case at hand means that there is simply nothing there, even though we think there is. The argument relies on the existence of the possibility that we inaccurately speak as though something were there when it could (at least) be the case that there really is not. Lowe might address the case in passing: “if we really want to include ‘non-beings’ in our ontology, then we had better not treat the terms ‘entity’ and ‘being’ as synonymous after all, at least so long as ‘entity’ is taken to denote our topmost ontological priority”. (Lowe, 2002: 16) Considerations such as these may be fatal to the project. I.e., I don’t know whether it would help or hinder to include into our ontology what may not exist, since we would perhaps need to include it in order to predicate that we should exclude it. None the less, I will carry on.      

Premise 1 and 2 are supported by definition. (Watson, 70 Core Concept: 5 & 7) If the totality of the state of affairs that obtains concerning our conception of space turns out to be about an absence, then we might consider the possibility that our term for space could be a mere representation and have no reference.

An initial step is to ask what under what conditions, if any, we accurately say that our representations are merely representations. Also, under what conditions our representations do not refer, if in fact the latter conditions differ from the former. First, I follow Lowe and Watson in maintaining that it is possible for there to be cases of mere representation as well as cases in which our representations fail to refer.

The likelihood of the argument above being sound improves if we can model our representation of space on representations that fail to refer, and on representations that represent something which is not real. For example, “Napoleon is a part of reality, but my imaginary friend is not.” (Watson, 70 Core Concepts: 5) I would think that if our concept of space were imaginary in a similar way that an imaginary friend is imaginary, then it could be that space might not be real in the same sense. More plausibly, if ‘the equator’ can be said to not be part of reality due to its imaginary status, then ‘space’ could be seen to be excluded from reality as well, on similar grounds.

That is enough to visualize what is needed concerning 1 and reality. Concerning reference, “we should be wary of assuming that a singular noun-phrase whose function appears to be referential really does function in a referential way.” (Lowe, 2002: 214) Here’s an argument on which we can model space’s putative failure to refer: “When Jeff sees a mirage, the content of his perception is ‘watery substance ahead’; his vision is inaccurate, because there is no watery substance ahead. His perception failed to refer to anything.” (Watson, Seventy Core Concepts: 7) I have restated this argument in the abstract thus: If what obtains between material objects is really absence, but the content of our representation is “space”, then our representation is inaccurate, because there is no space, only material objects and their absence. If this -or something similar to this- were possibly so, then our perception of space might fail to refer to anything. One line of investigation to pursue concerns the possibility of space being an empty name, since “empty names lack referents and therefore lack meanings but may be used to convey information pragmatically.” (Adams, F. & Fuller, G., 2007: Abstract) 

Clearly, a way for this position to advance is for it to be possible that all the state of affairs that are otherwise predicated by employing the concept of space could be predicated about by alluding to the state of affairs of material objects only. Lowe deems that the most uncontentious predication concerning space is “its three-dimensional regions or volumes” (Lowe, 2002: 254) Other candidates that I have found are that space: is dimensional; is where objects reside; is where physical things are extended; is where material objects could possibly be (Lowe, 2002: 266); is immaterial; has parts (regions, boundaries and points) and that it has topography. I will not fully embark on evaluating whether said predications depend upon material objects, or whether all are really just predications about objects. But there is some hope for this in Newman, who contends that: “the points of space… are contingent on material objects” (Newman, 1989: 200), “the only way we know about space is through matter” (Newman, 201), “any notion of equality of length comes from physical objects”. (Newman, 209)

Still:
Space as theoretical postulate due to “possibility of where objects are”
Problems for relationalism in general: absolute acceleration.
Still refer even if refer mistakenly???
Conclusion…

Notas

[1] The term “objects” will mean “material objects” throughout the present work, unless specified otherwise.

[2] I will ignore the possibility that objects may co-exist in the same location with another object. “Material objects and any portion of matter excludes any other from the space that it occupies –matter is, as we say, ‘impenetrable’.” (Lowe, 2002: 273)

[3] (Lowe E.J., 2007: 264)

[4] “The absolutist conception of space may also –and perhaps more perspicuously- be called a substantivalist conception of space.” (Lowe, 2002: 272) I will prefer the use of ‘substantivalist’ throughout the paper.